God’s Word in Human Hands, Part 5: How Epistemology Affects Ontology and Why It Matters

In choosing an epistemology of practical realism, Sparks alters the ontology of the Bible. That is, he reimagines the essence of the Bible itself. In adopting an epistemology that does not require the existence of revelation of God,[1] Sparks has altered the very nature of Scripture. The ontological implications of epistemological revision were noticed already in the late 19^th century by B.B. Warfield. “A special school of Old Testament criticism, which has, for some years, been gaining somewhat widespread acceptance of its results having been accepted, a ‘changed view of the Bible’ follows which implies a reconstructed doctrine of inspiration, and, indeed, also a whole new theology.”[2] One cannot evoke an epistemology counter to that presented in Scripture and expect to maintain the same ontology of Scripture.

Therefore, while Sparks likes to speak of the similarity between foundationalism and anti-realism, it is the practical realist who arrives at a view of Scripture similar to foundationalism, and both are significantly different from how Scripture portrays itself. The foundationalist, arriving at certain truth through either rationalism or empiricism, subjects Scripture to tests of reason and historical and scientific scrutiny, and finds it to be lacking verifiability (this is the modernist critique). The practical realist, arriving at approximation of truth through a dialogue of text, community and culture, subjects Scripture to scientific, cultural and linguistic analysis, and finds the clear statements of Scripture about itself to be lacking verifiability (this is the postmodernist critique). Both approaches, modern and postmodern, in effect do the same thing to Scripture, albeit from opposite ends of the spectrum.

Warfield proceeds to consider exactly what Sparks is eager to discuss—the presence of “problems” in the text of Scripture. Warfield delineates the two-fold strength of the claim to inerrancy that any criticism of the Bible must overcome if it is to be considered a serious challenge to the authority of Scripture. First, there is the testimony of Scripture itself about its ontology. Cornelius Van Til, following Bavinck and Turretin, emphasized the self-attesting authority of Scripture. That is, the primary way of knowing what Scripture is requires us to take at face value what it says about itself. Any other starting point of determining the nature of Scripture places man’s autonomous reason over the Bible’s testimony about itself. After considering the genuine difficulties that the human involvement in Scripture brings, John Murray warns that to attempt to establish the authority of Scripture by any other means would be fruitless. “Thus, on the question of warrant for the proposition that Scripture is infallible, what are we to say? The only ground is the witness of Scripture to itself, to its own origin, character, and authority.”[3] So our starting point for claiming the authority, infallibility and character of Scripture must remain its own testimony about itself.

Second, says Warfield, there is the whole mass of evidence that shows that the biblical writers were trustworthy. Now, here is the very issue with which Sparks wrestles. For him, the external evidence shows that the Bible is not what it says it is, at least not as it has been historically understood. Certainly, no inerrantist would object to external evidence clarifying and sharpening our understanding of inspiration. Yet, this is not always recognized by critics of inerrancy. Many assume that inerrantists hold to an unsophisticated and unnuanced dictation theory of inspiration. This is simply not true. As an example of the complexity of evangelical positions on inerrancy, Norman Geisler lists eighteen clarifications regarding mistaken notions of inerrancy.[4] These clarifications take into consideration such elements as interpretation, context, style, differing accounts, phenomena, literary devices, genre, and grammar.

The options for evangelical theology of Scripture, then, are not limited to a either flat, dictation theory of inspiration or a text that is to be doubted and assumed to contain error. Inspiration and inerrancy can be held while recognizing the complexity of the issue, and taking seriously the apparent contradictions between what the text says about itself, and how it appears to us. Once again, one’s epistemology will either allow or disallow working toward a solution. Practical realism, as Sparks presents it, seems to disallow a doctrine of Scripture consistent with Scripture’s testimony of itself.

If practical realism, then, is inadequate, are evangelicals only left with foundationalism as an epistemology? The answer is, “no.” Sparks is right about many of his criticisms of foundationalism, but that, as we have seen, does not make his proposal any more plausible. There is another option available that avoids the pitfalls of both foundationalist and realist epistemologies. Sparks (improperly) dismisses Van Til as a foundationalist, and further misconstrues his epistemology, which can provide evangelicals with a theory of truth that is faithful to Scripture and can stand up to intense epistemological scrutiny.

In Part 6 we will look at the more biblically faithful revelational epistemology of Cornelius Van Til.

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[1] In no way does practical realism require revelation. Practical realism can be and has been developed as a system with no need of revelation. As a result, its suitability as an epistemology adequate for Christian theology is in question..

[2] Benjamin B. Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible (Samuel G. Craig, ed. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1948), 170.

[3] John Murray, “The Infallibility of Scripture,” in Collected Writings of John Murray, Volume 1: The Claims of Truth (Carlisle, PA: the Banner of Truth Trust, 1976), 10.

[4] Norman Geisler, Systematic Theology: Volume 1 Introduction, Bible (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 2002), 507-12.